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ABSTRACT 
The aim of the paper is to contribute to a clearer depiction of public goods. The theoretical 
conundrums of the standard approach are highlighted before discussing a broader view of 
public goods that includes various types of merit goods. It is suggested that there is no definite 
technical criterion to decide which type of good should be deemed public:  a decision 
concerning societal priorities is needed. The article therefore discusses who is to decide, and 
how, these priorities and indicates that voting does not lead to a univocal decision unless 
appropriate decision criteria are depicted. Public goods should allow people to choose how to 
organize their society but, in so far as they are not provided, people may be unable to 
adequately choose the very public goods they need. Elucidation of this vicious circle may 
provide for a more rigorous classification of public goods and suggest a pragmatic way to 
bypass it.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Recent policy in most of the Western world has focused on reducing government action in the 
economy. This has occurred because at the macroeconomic level public expenditure is claimed 
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 not to be an appropriate means to stabilize or enhance growth. It has occurred also because at 
the microeconomic level public regulation and/or the (direct or indirect) provision of goods is 
supposed to involve inefficiency.1 
As far as the microeconomic aspect of the question is concerned, generally public 
discourse takes it for granted that markets are efficient, and that the very notion of efficiency is 
clearly defined. The type of goods (including services) that government is supposed to provide 
involves a slightly more slippery issue. It is generally acknowledged that public goods that are 
typical of the minimal state – e.g. defence and the preservation of the legal order - should be 
provided by government. As for other goods, they may be deemed important for growth or 
improving equity, but the problem is that either they are inadequately provided or involve costs 
that clash with budget constraints. Under these circumstances most policy discussions are 
centred on the relative efficiency of the actors - public or private – who are supposed to provide 
the public good. Political discussions, therefore, tend to be reminiscent of the so-called equity-
efficiency trade-off whereby the combination of these two policy goals is a matter of value 
judgments. 
Although this type of arguments tends to be commonplace, my view is that they are not 
grounded in a rigorous theoretical discussion. The problem is that the demand for these goods 
is most often associated with the pursuit of ethical goals whereas the dominant economic 
approach – the New Welfare Economics – considers ethical and technical issues as 
conceptually independent of one another. This is precisely where the problem lies. Indeed, a 
major tenet of this article is that what public goods are does not depend on their technical 
characteristics alone but on the ends that a society pursues. What is wrong with public 
discourse, therefore, is less a lack of technical details than the belief that the issue is basically 
technical rather than ethical. 
The aim of this article is not to discuss public discourse per se, but to investigate the 
theoretical backing for the claim that government should or should not provide certain goods. 
These will be referred to generically as public goods. 
In general, the peculiarity of public goods is that, although they are beneficial, it is up to 
government to provide them because private actors have no incentive to do so. This broad 
depiction raises the following issues. First, who are these goods beneficial for: does it have to 
be everybody, or can it be just a section of the community? Second, how are benefits to be 
assessed: should a Pareto criterion hold, or can we claim that the benefits they provide to 
someone may be at the expense of someone else? Third, should the benefits be associated with 
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 individuals or can they transcend them? Fourth, how much of these goods should government 
provide? 
Depending on the answers to these questions, our list of public goods may range from 
those normally associated with a minimal state (e.g. a legal system that protects property rights) 
to those provided by the welfare state (e.g. education for everybody) and beyond (e.g. a 
manufacturing structure that avoids environmental degradation). On the other hand, depending 
on how we conceive of the economy, those same goods may perform different tasks. Thus, the 
legal system that protects property rights and is conventionally considered to benefit everybody 
may be viewed as a means to defend those who have property from those who don’t have it 
(Ver Eecke 1998). This interdependence between the definition of a public good and the 
economy to which it refers implies that a clearer view of how these goods can and should be 
conceived can emerge only as we proceed. 
Given these premises, it is appropriate to situate the ensuing argument within the general 
discussion about public goods. The next section therefore surveys possible strategies to 
investigate public goods, distinguishing them by their theoretical and methodological premises. 
Since the aim is to discuss public goods less as a theoretical conundrum for students in public 
economics than as a major issue for economic policy, the focus is on social and societal 
relevance rather than on internal consistency issues. Following this survey, the standard 
approach is outlined, to highlight the theoretical difficulties that it faces. The standard 
definition of a public good is rather restrictive. To take account of goods that are – or could be 
– provided by the government, the discussion is extended to a broader approach that includes 
various types of merit goods, i.e. goods whose benefits for the community cannot be traced 
back to individual benefits alone. 
There are legitimate reasons for this more extensive perspective, but the discussion 
suggests that there is no definite technical criterion to decide which type of good to include or 
omit instead suggesting that a decision concerning societal priorities is required. The discussion 
therefore moves on to who is to decide and how, and points out that – owing to macro effects, 
historical change and non-converging interests - the expression of preferences through voting 
does not lead to a univocal decision about what to do. A broader perspective is required that 
considers decision criteria. Following a brief outline of what these may be, it is argued that 
public goods are supposed to allow people to choose how to organize the society in which they 
participate. At the same time, in so far as these goods are not provided, people may be unable 
to adequately choose. 
This vicious circle may have no strictly logical solution, but its elucidation is important 
 for two reasons. First, it provides the elements for a more rigorous classification of public 
goods in terms of meta-preferences. Second, it suggests a pragmatic approach to bypass the 
vicious circle. The main point of the argument is that the solution is not based on some type of 
economic technicality: it is a political issue. To support this claim, the discussion highlights 
that, once we relax some restrictive assumptions of conventional economics, the degrees of 
freedom for political action increase. 
Concluding remarks briefly consider how to understand prevalent contemporary public 
policies. 
The article discusses public goods in relation to contributions that are most often centred 
on neoclassical theory. It avoids stressing the latter’s internal inconsistencies and the 
implausibility of its assumptions. Rather, the focus is the plausibility of a price-centred 
coordination of economic activity when public goods are considered.2 It is contended that even 
those who are willing to accept a neoclassical approach must acknowledge that, given the 
prerequisites to function properly, an economy such as the one in which we live is hardly 
conceivable as static and that the degrees of freedom concerning change are much greater than 
is conventionally believed. I posit that if these conclusions are reasonable for scholars in the 
neoclassical tradition, they should be a fortiori plausible for non-mainstream approaches. 
 
2. Disentangling the public goods issue 
 
To conceptualise public goods three analytical strategies are possible.   The first one is to rely 
on the conventional approach. From a neoclassical perspective, public goods are a case of 
‘market failure’. While coordination of economic activities should occur through relative 
prices, ‘market failures’ prejudge allocative efficiency. Thus, the problem is how to reconcile 
price-centred coordination with any public action initiated in response to those purported 
failures. While the issue has a strictly technical dimension – e.g. how an information 
transmitting mechanism such as relative prices can deal with incomplete information – it also 
has an ideological dimension. This emerges particularly when merit goods, and the ethical 
judgments they involve, enter the picture. More specifically, the very fact that someone may 
think ethically, rather than merely process data to pursue self-interest, begs for a reassessment 
of the conventional conception of individuals: whether they merely pursue self-interest or are 
also able to choose according to some value system.3 This reassessment, in turn, has important 
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 implications for the relation between individual and collective choices. As we shall see, this 
involves either neglecting a range of important issues or facing world view aporias.4  
The second strategy is to redefine and extend the conventional concepts by drawing on 
factual experience and on insights from other disciplines. This may be a useful point of 
departure but the issue it raises is whether it qualifies and supplements the conventional view5 
rather than advocating an alternative conceptual framework.6 More specifically the attempt to 
introduce new concepts within a compact theory such as the neoclassical one tends to raise 
more problems than it solves. For instance, as mentioned above, Ver Eecke (1998) points out 
that even public goods generally associated with the minimal state or neoliberal views favour 
someone at the expense of someone else, which means that they involve ethical judgments and, 
for this reason, must be conceived of as merit goods. He adds that these goods should be 
provided in so far as they are justified by the wishes of citizens and consumers. The 
justification, he contends, is that ‘The first thing that Western citizens as economic actors wish 
is a free market.’ (ibid., p. 140). If we agree for the sake of argument, the problem lies in the 
term ‘free market’. If it was defined by reference to neoclassical theory, its compatibility with 
justice and human dignity is, at the very least, subject to specific conditions concerning 
distribution and how ‘market failures’ are dealt with. To meet these conditions – e.g. through 
redistribution - we might have to go beyond the minimal state and conceive of merit goods that 
clash with some ‘freedom’ of the market. The main point, here, is that, by merely juxtaposing 
ethics onto the conventional approach, Ver Eecke fails to acknowledge the need for an 
assessment of the implicit ethical judgments that underlie the ‘free’ functioning of a 
neoclassical market.   
Similar difficulties appear in Malkin and Wildavsky’s (1991) work. They claim that 
public goods are a social construct, which cannot be defined in strictly technical terms, but at 
the same time they are adamant about the existence of an objective positive economics. It is not 
clear whether they consider that attempts to provide better definitions of public goods are a 
matter of whim, which would be an oversimplification of reality. They do fail to consider that, 
in so far as the notion of public good is a social construct, the same may be said about the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Paganelli 2005) to Colm’s (1956, p. 409) claim that ‘A more useful concept, I believe, is that [each 
voter] has an idea of what the government should do for him but also for others and the nation or even 
the world as a whole, and possibly for future generations.’ 
4 A detailed survey of recent attempts to overcome these aporias is in Florenzano (2010). 
5 According to Mann (2006, p. 511), for instance, ‘The hypothesis is that the current utilitarian 
framework for justifying market interventions is not sufficiently developed.’ 
6 Desmarais-Tremblay (2016) provides a detailed historical survey of how the discussion on merit goods 
impinges on these two views. 
 
 concepts that underlie economic thought, so that different views of what the economy is and 
how it functions may coexist. In the same manner as Ver Eecke’s treatment of ethics, Malkin 
and Wildavsky juxtapose insights from theories of cognition onto the conventional view of 
economics. The result is a failure to reconcile their relativistic approach to the knowledge of 
public goods with an absolutist approach to the knowledge of the economy. 
The third strategy eschews the conventional approach in that it does not assume that 
price-centred coordination of the economy, or the individualism underlying it, exist a priori. 
Based on this strategy, Altvater grounds his discussion of public goods on the distinction 
between human security – that is, ‘freedom from fear and freedom from want’ (Altvater 2004, 
p. 47) - and commercial security, i.e. ‘the security to do business in a trouble-free environment’ 
(ibid., p. 52). These two types of securities reflect two assessment criteria: an ethical one 
concerning the quality of human life and a strictly economic one concerning how a capitalist 
economy is historically structured. The distinctive aspect of this approach, relative to the first 
two strategies, is that the former criterion is not viewed as a constraint on the economy but as a 
policy guideline of the same standing. From this perspective, Altvater further points out that 
commodities are unlikely to achieve human security while public goods can. Similarly to Ver 
Eecke, he points out that, in so doing, public goods ‘can be good for some but “no good” for 
others’ (ibid., p. 47) but he does not pretend to make these reflections consistent with the 
compact framework of conventional price-centred coordination. 
Colm (1960) has a similar strategic stance when he debates the characteristics of the 
public interest – thus what the government is supposed to do – not only as a compensation for 
market failures but as the only way to pursue the ultimate goals of a society. His approach 
focuses on what is deemed a relevant issue, quite independently of its implications for 
conventional theory. 
The problem with the third strategy is that, since no general framework is assumed that 
circumscribes the notion of public good, it is likely to raise more issues than it can deal with. 
More specifically, in so far as we consider public goods in relation to particular aspects of the 
economy, reference to the latter as a whole is unnecessary. It is an altogether different issue if 
these goods affect the economy as a whole and involve an assessment of what are the general 
goals of society. What appears to be a drawback, however, may turn out to be conducive to a 
more insightful and theoretically fruitful conclusion precisely because it forsakes not only the 
conceptual straightjacket of conventional theory but also the pretence to be an all-
encompassing account of the economy. 
Let us consider the implications of these strategies for the specific public policy issue of 
 this article. The first two approaches assume that the economy is based on price-centred 
coordination. Their problem is to deal with circumstances that prejudge that coordination. In 
the first case it is a market failure, a shortcoming that is internal to the coordinating mechanism 
itself. In the second case it is ethics or cognition, that is, exogenous interferences. The 
theoretical issue is to reconcile these shortcomings with an as efficient as possible price-centred 
coordination. The third strategy proceeds in the opposite way. It assumes that there are social 
and societal issues that require some type of policy. It investigates what kind of rules are 
required to set up an economy that provides for a solution to these issues?7  
From a methodological perspective we are confronted with two different conceptions of 
the economy.8 The first two strategies rely on a closed-systems view whereby, given a range of 
conditions, the economy can function independently of any interaction with the society it is a 
part of. The third strategy is based on an open-systems perspective whereby how the economy 
functions depends on the society it is a part of.9  
The two views lead to different approaches to policy. In the first case, the economy has 
its own rules and the issue is to remove, or make up for, the shortcomings that prejudge them. 
Difficult as this task may be, it is up to the economist to devise a solution or a set of solutions 
that the policy maker can choose from. In the second case, the economy is basically organized 
according to rules that reflect historical circumstances and societal priorities. Since the latter 
are potentially countless, there is a corresponding infinity of economic arrangements. 
Economists can use their theoretical toolbox to identify possible inconsistencies, but the 
identification of a desired arrangement is not strictly economic: it also depends on society and 
on how it interacts with the economy. 
The sections that follow will pursue this third strategy to link these concepts to a general 
view of society’s ultimate goals. The critiques in the general discussion, however, are not 
presented as a proof that the alternative approaches are inevitably wrong. They point out 
specific issues that, while suggesting that the third strategy is more insightful, aim to engage 
scholars who follow different strategies.10  
 
3. Public goods: The standard approach 
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The standard definition of public good is straightforward: a public good is non- rivalrous and 
non-excludable. The policy issue is how much of it the government should provide. The 
problem lies in non-rivalry. In order to consume a private good, individuals are obliged to buy 
it, thereby providing information about the benefit they get out of the good. When they face a 
public good, they can benefit from the provision of the good independently of whether they 
paid for it or not. 
Optimal provision of the good requires that, given a range of appropriate circumstances, 
the total cost must be equal to the sum of the prices that individuals would be willing to pay for 
it. Since they can benefit from provision of the good even if they do not pay for it, it is 
convenient for them not to provide the information and to act as free riders. This precludes the 
determination of the amount of good that should be (optimally) produced. To make up for this 
drawback a government can base its decision on a social welfare function: Samuelson (1954, p. 
389) clearly states that: 
the failure of market catallactics in no way denies the following truth: given sufficient 
knowledge the optimal decisions can always be found by scanning over all the attainable 
states of the world and selecting the one which according to the postulated ethical welfare 
function is best. The solution ‘exists’; the problem is how to ‘find’ it (quoted in Hammond 
2015, p. 151). 
In this case, however, what the individuals are unwilling to provide – information 
concerning their preferences - remains unavailable to the government. Individuals can avoid 
paying for the good so long as the good is non-excludable. Excludability can, therefore, turn 
out to be a partial solution to the problem that public goods raise. In so far as it is possible to 
devise some technological (e.g. TV decoders) or legal (e.g. patents) form of excludability, a 
public good may become a club good. This prevents consumers from withholding information 
and allows a price to be fixed. Excludability may, therefore, allow a return to market-based 
allocation. Unfortunately, even if all other assumptions that allow for optimality hold, this is 
not enough to achieve an efficient outcome. ‘Exclusion may be possible – for example, by 
charging a toll to cross a bridge. But the charge will be inefficient if the bridge is underused, 
because in that case the bridge’s benefits are nonrival’ (Musgrave and Musgrave 2003, p. xiii) 
How relevant are these issues in practice? One way to deal with this question is to 
identify what goods meet the above definition. Traditionally, the public goods par excellence 
are national defence and law enforcement. Other goods are non-rival, however, in that they are 
characterized by consumption externalities: computer software, infrastructures, network goods 
 such as utilities or the internet, payment systems ranging from credit/debit cards to money. In 
many instances, they are provided by private agents, but this happens in much the same way as 
for the bridge in the example above.  
Leaving aside specific goods, if the production of any output involves environmental 
degradation, through the depletion of natural resources or the production of waste, basically 
that output affects other people. Apparently, this issue has to do less with public goods than 
with externalities. It is nonetheless possible to argue that services that reduce pollution or make 
up in any other way for the depletion of the environment are public goods. Furthermore, if the 
deterioration is not the same for all goods, (the composition of) output as such turns out to be a 
public good. The issue is that, if interdependent utility functions characterize a great deal of 
economic activity, social accounting should not be restricted to individual utility. 
Summing up, the standard theory of public goods is centred on non-rivalry. A great 
many goods and the very composition of output fit this feature. Non-rival goods may or may 
not be excludable. When they aren’t, the provision issue emerges completely: there is no actual 
way to decide the types and quantity to provide optimally. When they are excludable, 
optimality is not achieved anyway because the goods are priced as if they were rivalrous. 
Under these circumstances, the criteria to decide who should provide a good – whether the 
government or private agents – and how much of it should be provided are rather shaky. The 
problem is that the efficiency criterion is not clear. If market failures exist then public policy 
pursues a ‘second best’, which is a rather difficult goal to define in practice. It is not only that, 
as Markovitz (1998, p. 8) argues, ‘many law professors and an increasing number of 
economists ignore Second-Best Theory because they like clear bottom lines and correctly 
perceive that TBLE [third-best-allocatively-efficient] analysis will often lead to conclusions 
that are fact-dependent and, on that account, contestable.’ What is most likely is that more than 
one solution can be envisaged to make up for a market imperfection, which leads us back to the 
knowledge requirements referred to by Samuelson. 
The absence of generally accepted guidelines, compounded by the possible 
ineffectiveness of governments in providing adequate solutions, leads to a debate centred on 
personal sensitiveness, which boils down to the degree of optimism concerning governments. 
Thus, it is not surprising that, in a discussion with Musgrave, Buchanan summarizes their 
divergences in very simple terms: 
My differences with Musgrave can be summarized along a unidimensional spectrum, with 
neither of us located at the extremes. He places considerably more relative weight on the 
‘good’ that collective action can do, whereas I place more relative weight on the ‘bad’ that 
 unconstrained collective action might do. (Buchanan and Musgrave 2000, p. 108).  
 
4. Public goods: A broader approach 
 
Public action often relates to a rather broad variety of goods (and services), including not only 
national defence and law enforcement but also health, education, pensions, basic goods such as 
clean water, a sewage system and housing, and basic scientific research. It may consist in 
providing the goods as such, in subsidizing their purchase or in regulating the legal features of 
the market where private agents provide these goods. Whatever the specific features of this 
action, it has to do with goods that are particularly important for the standard of living of a 
community: in some cases, one might argue that they involve lexicographic preferences. 
Decisions to enhance or reduce public action may, thus, dramatically affect the community as 
some of the above goods apparently do not meet the criteria set forth by Samuelson even 
though, as a matter of fact, they are often provided by governments. Samuelson (1954), who 
originally argued that government expenditure was required only because of the non-rivalrous 
nature of public goods, subsequently acknowledged that other circumstances could account for 
the provision of goods by government. Aside from a range of circumstances that are generally 
included among so-called market failures, he mentioned that government might provide goods 
such as education and hospitals to make up for tax and transfer policies that fail to achieve a 
desired redistribution.11   
The Musgraves provided a different approach to this issue by introducing the concept of 
merit good. 
There exists a community interest as such, an interest which is attributable to the community 
as a whole and which does not involve a ‘mere’ addition, vertical or horizontal, of individual 
interests. This community interest then is said to give rise to communal wants, wants which 
are generated by and pertain to the welfare of the group as a whole. (Musgrave and 
Musgrave 1989, p. 54-5; see also Musgrave 2008). 
Merit goods – which satisfy these wants - are like the public goods discussed so far in that they 
affect many individuals. They differ in that the benefits they provide can seldom be measured 
in terms of individual utility. With this type of good Samuelson’s solution is inadequate on 
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 strictly formal grounds, independently of its actual practicability. 
It may be reasonable that governments provide the broad variety of goods listed above. 
On strictly economic grounds, output growth is likely to be greater if workers are healthy and 
educated, if they can rely on the advanced technology that can only be achieved through basic 
scientific research and if they don’t have to worry about basic living conditions for their 
households, including elderly people. It is, nonetheless unlikely that they can deal with these 
issues by themselves, owing to incomplete information and an intertemporal preference that 
prejudges their understanding of the longer-term consequences of their choices. 
In the case of scientific research, apart from the public good features of scientific and 
technological knowledge (Arrow 1962), individuals may be unable to predict what outcome – 
and gains – to which their investment will lead. The issue, here, is not that information is 
incomplete but that it is altogether absent: by definition, research consists in dealing with the 
unknown. 
More generally, incomplete information may lead individuals to underestimate the 
future, that is, it may affect intertemporal preferences. ‘Inappropriate’ intertemporal 
preferences, in turn, may lead individuals to underestimate the information they require. Thus, 
what is at issue is not only the absence of informational inputs but the inability to adequately 
appreciate and, consequently, process those inputs that are available. Truly, governments may 
not be a full-fledged solution to these problems: They do not know  individual utilities and the 
intertemporal preferences of citizenship. It is nonetheless the case that, while individuals focus 
on their specific goals and intertemporal preferences, governments are organized to transcend 
individual goals and individuals’ lifetimes. 
The type of goods listed above is not the only one that involves a possible public action. 
Natural resources (oceans, lakes, forests, glaciers, coastal reserves, wildlife), the national 
heritage, (clean) air, financial stability and peace, amongst others, are generally believed to be 
significant for society. The services required to preserve them may be considered public merit 
goods. From a conventional perspective, this type of good raises several problems. Growth is 
generally viewed as a positive outcome for all but it may affect the natural (Boulding 1966) and 
cultural (Pasolini 1976) environment. Financial innovation and the armaments industry may 
favour output in some sort of short-run, but their long-term consequences may be disastrous 
(Minsky 1982; Eisenhower 1961). What is at issue, here, is not only a lack of information but 
two contrasting goals. The conventional way to deal with it is centred on the existence of a 
trade-off. The issue is how to assess it. Should we decide according to existing prices, even 
though they are inefficient prices, i.e. prices that reflect market failures, thereby precluding 
 choices that lead to the efficient allocation of resources? Should we assign property rights on 
goods that are not private goods since they affect the utility of society as a whole? 
Similar issues arise also when public merit goods are provided for redistributive 
reasons. This is the case with, for instance, public schools and a national health system: their 
purpose is to ensure that everybody has access to these services, independently of the income 
or wealth of the beneficiaries. Here too, the conventional approach is to deal with the issue in 
terms of a trade-off, assuming you can only base your choice on the existing set of relative 
prices. While this may seem reasonable from a pragmatic point of view, it is not a rigorous way 
to frame the issue. Along with the above considerations about the inefficiency of prices when 
they reflect market failures, there is no reason to assume a priori that original endowments are 
socially desirable. 
It is beyond doubt that, whatever we choose under these circumstances, a positive 
outcome for everybody is unlikely to occur. Someone is bound to suffer the consequences of 
the restrictions on output that follow anti-pollution laws or of the reduction in relative income 
or wealth consequent on any redistributive action. R. Musgrave and P. Musgrave (1989, pp. 57- 
58) acknowledge this issue: 
Individuals as members of their society may feel obliged to share certain costs (e.g., for 
maintaining the Lincoln Memorial) or to accept certain priorities in the use of their own 
funds because this is called for as a matter of respect for community values. 
This statement points out that community values may prevail over individual 
preferences. When and how this should occur is an important problem. Before discussing this 
issue in greater detail, it should be stressed that community values need not focus on individual 
benefits alone. For many Americans, making sure that the Lincoln Memorial – or the Statue of 
Liberty - is in proper condition is important not only because these are nice statues to look at: 
they represent symbols of a national identity. Allowing everybody to look at them is considered 
a way to reinforce not only one’s own but everybody else’s sense of belonging. 
There is another aspect of public merit goods that deserves attention. Action in favour 
of the community does not merely reflect existing community values. It also feeds back on 
their creation and evolution. 
Consider the city of London: to the extent that in our work, travel and play we participate in 
the irreducibly common actions of, say, crowds, queues, rush-hour, Sunday afternoon on the 
London South Bank, and so on (ad infinitum), so we help to engender an extraordinarily 
complex and obviously irreducibly common good – one entirely unavailable to any of the 
individuals concerned acting separately (Deneulin and Townsend 2007, p. 11). 
 Whatever our thoughts about the quality of life that such an environment leads to, it is 
beyond doubt that we generate that environment by interacting with others. In turn, that 
environment becomes part of us and shapes the way we are. Thus, the decision to provide 
Londoners with facilities such as public transport eventually affects how and where they 
interact, thereby determining what London – and being a Londoner - means to them. In this 
sense a community cannot be reduced to the sum of its members: it is not a mere collectivity. 
All this implies that whether a good is public or not depends not only on the benefits it may 
exert on individuals but on how it feeds back to the community as a whole. 
Notwithstanding Deneulin and Townsend’s specific reference to a common good, what 
this leads to is that community values need not be considered exogenous. Their creation and 
change may be part of policy goals that are centred on the quality of life, i.e. on something that 
encompasses strictly economic welfare but cannot be reduced to it. Viewed from this 
perspective, merit goods involve much more than the incomplete information discussed above. 
They beg the question: what kind of community do we want? To some extent, this is not 
enough, however. In so far as we all belong to different communities – religious, political, 
professional, national, local, etc. – decisions concerning merit goods relate to the broader 
community that – in one way or another - encompasses them all. 
Summing up, even if we remain within the bounds of a conventional economics 
approach, it is difficult not to deal with a range of goods that, just like standard public goods, 
benefit more than one individual but, differently from them, reflect goals that are irreducible to 
individuals. This raises two issues. The first and original one is what goods and how much of 
them should be provided. The second one is how to deal with two different types of choice 
criteria: that of individuals and that of a community. 
 
5. Who’s decision? 
 
In his treatment of public goods, R. Musgrave provides pragmatic solutions to some of 
Samuelson’s drawbacks. The concept of exclusion qualifies public goods, allowing for a 
distinction between these and similar goods (club goods) which need not be provided by the 
government. The concept of merit good accounts for the public provisioning of goods that 
Samuelson (1954) was unable to include in what he referred to as a ‘pure theory of public 
expenditure’. These qualifications, however, raise important theoretical issues. As noted above, 
exclusion cannot solve the optimization problem: at the very least it leaves an externality. As 
for public merit goods, they are identified according to non-individualistic criteria (societal 
 values), which are different from – and somewhat inconsistent with - the choice criterion based 
on individual preferences. This raises the issue of what criteria should be used to achieve 
efficiency and societal goals. 
Viewed from a conventional perspective, public merit goods act as an exogenous 
interference with individual market choices. As Ver Eecke (1998, p. 137, original emphasis) 
points out 
Public goods are political economic goods which the government provides with the intention 
of respecting the wishes of consumers. The consumers need help because public goods have 
technical (factual) characteristics that make it difficult for individuals to acquire them in an 
optimal way. Merit goods, on the other hand, are political economic goods which the 
government provides by a method or at a level which disregards the wishes of consumers. 
As a result, merit goods may not only affect market performance but even endanger 
democracy. The latter issue is clearly stated in R. Musgrave and P. Musgrave (1989), who 
point out that there is an inconsistency between the individualistic stance of conventional 
economics and the notion of community. Thus, although ‘common values and concerns do 
exist in a cohesive society and their existence may place some limitations on the conventional 
doctrine of individual choice’ (ibid., p. 58) it is the case that ‘the concept of merit or demerit 
goods, …, must be viewed with caution because it may serve as a vehicle for totalitarian rule.’ 
(ibid., p. 58). 
As we extend the discussion from standard public goods to merit goods, it is difficult to 
minimize the importance of decisions concerning government provision. The problem is that, 
while an ideal, if practically useless, solution exists that reconciles the provision of standard 
public goods with the rationale of individual choice, merit goods centred on community values 
are irreducible to individual choice. While this suggests that there undoubtedly is scope for a 
choice criterion that transcends markets, the original problem – what that criterion should 
consist of - remains. 
It is possible to play down the importance of these issues by arguing that these 
‘communal’ merit goods are an exception and that their overall influence on market 
performance is not particularly important. R. Musgrave (Buchanan and Musgrave 2000, p. 42) 
seems to follow this approach when stating that he does not ‘wish to assign merit goods thus 
defined a major role’. If we look at the variety of goods listed in the previous section, it is 
rather difficult to agree with this remark. On the other hand, not everybody may agree that 
merit goods include all that variety. The fact is that, as R. Musgrave and P. Musgrave (1989) 
argue, what we depict as merit goods depends on collective values. Based on this premise, to 
 assess how pervasive they are, we should focus on what people value. 
Sekera (2015, p. ii) contends that ‘we need to understand how public goods and 
services originate through collective choice and collective payment.’. More specifically, she 
states that ‘orthodox economic theory, and Samuelson’s definition, ignore the reality that 
public goods derive from social as well as economic forces. In reality, public goods originate 
through collective choice (voting) and are funded by collective payment (taxes)’ (Sekera 2014, 
p. 3). Sekera’s emphasis is not on the technical features of the goods but on how they are 
valued. In this sense, although she refers to public goods, it is merit goods she has in mind. The 
two terms will be used interchangeably in what follows. 
According to Sekera’s definition, what are public goods depends on what voters decide 
them to be. This definition raises two issues. First, do voters always choose appropriately? For 
this to occur we should expect them to be adequately informed: they should have all the 
information they need, and it should not be biased, e.g. through advertisements. Furthermore, 
they should be able to process that information appropriately: they should have an adequate 
rationality (what might be associated to a computer’s hardware) and the ability to situate the 
information in an appropriate interpretative framework (the analogy being, in this case, with a 
computer’s software). Finally, they should have the time to think their choice over.12 
The second issue is more specific: is it enough for voters to choose, independently of 
any discriminating criterion? Based on Sekera’s argument, if a majority were to vote against 
public schools on the grounds that if you want an education you should pay for it, that would 
mean that education, and the knowledge it involves, is not a public good. Similarly, public law 
enforcement would be denied its public good nature if it was banished in the United States on 
the grounds that the Second Amendment to the Constitution allows individuals to take care of 
themselves. Leaving aside these extreme cases, should government budget problems lead to a 
cut in public expenditure, a good that is not provided any more would cease to be qualified as a 
public good. 
These examples suggest that collective values – and the goods they qualify – may not 
be as changeful as voting majorities. For instance, public goods may be based on fundamental 
social rights - such as those listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United 
Nations 2015) - which suggests that, quite independently of pricing issues, no trade-off should 
exist: they reflect lexicographic preferences. Alternatively, they may be based on a notion of 
welfare or well-being that, although culturally and historically specific, is nonetheless stable 
                                                     
12 Basically, what is at issue is how a choice comes out of a learning process and what social conditions 
allow that process to occur. 
 over time. 
Kaul (2001) follows a different approach. She depicts publicness in terms of 
participatory decision-making, fairness and inclusion. Inclusion consists in extending the 
potential access that people have to a good. This allows for the provision of socially relevant 
goods to broad sections of society.13 It is not residually-determined but the result of a policy 
choice. 
Kaul acknowledges that fairness can be defined in different ways. Her suggestion is to 
allow the desired notion to emerge from participatory decision-making. Let us, therefore 
examine this concept. 
The difference between mere voting and participatory decision-making is that, in the 
latter case, people can exchange their views, elaborate on them and possibly change their minds 
consequently. This does not exclude that, owing to bounded rationality, they can make wrong 
decisions, but it does favour pondering, compromise and greater awareness of common – as 
opposed to individual - values. In some instances, it may also be a means to enhance inclusion 
and empowerment. 
Much like in the voting case above, the issue that deserves further discussion is how to 
frame choices and decision-making. While this process may be relatively easy when small 
communities are concerned, it must meet quite a few requirements as the size and the 
complexity of the community increase. Awareness of what is at stake involves not only 
information – important as this may be14 – but also a toolbox to adequately interpret it, 
independently of what personal experience may suggest. More specifically, decision-making 
undoubtedly requires the ability to decide about benefits, constraints and costs. These are not 
straightforward, however. The macro-consequences of micro-decisions may not match 
expectations, either because the whole is not the sum of its parts (as in the Thrift Paradox) or 
because expectations become unreliable over time, owing to economic and societal change, 
such as the one discussed in the London transport example. Furthermore, decisions occur in a 
contested social environment. They affect different people in different ways, feeding back on 
economic, social and power relations (Kalecki 1943). Owing to varied identities, they also 
affect single individuals in complex ways: 
                                                     
13 In this sense, the opposite of excludability turns out to be inclusion rather than simple non-
excludability. 
14 Kaul points out, in this respect, that ‘Reality seems to be ahead of our thinking on this point. Just 
consider  the many so-called ‘watches’ that have emerged in the areas of human rights, social 
development and the environment. Increasingly, we also see impact assessments, notably on such issues 
as ‘trade and human development’ or ‘trade and the environment’. If these types of studies present 
sufficiently disaggregated measurements, people themselves would be able to decide whether and up to 
what point they consider a particular PG [public good] as a fair deal.’ (Kaul 2001 p. 17). 
 In fact we all have many identities, given by our relationships with various groups to which 
we belong and of which we see ourselves part. As members of a family, a community, a 
class, an occupation group, a nation, etc., we have a complex perception of ‘our interests’. 
So the point, …, that the pursuit of what we see to be our interest is not the only possible 
motive for choice, has to be supplemented by the further point that even what we see to be 
our interest may have various ‘social’ components (Sen 1986, p. 349). 
Desai’s (2003) historical assessment of the role of public goods complements these 
general issues. He points out that, during the 18th and 19th centuries, they were provided 
because ‘fear of the mob - of fast-growing urban populations - made European states provide 
such goods even while they preached the doctrine of laissez-faire and balanced budgets.’ (ibid., 
p. 68). In the 20th century universal franchise and the golden age of Keynesianism initially led 
to an exceptional growth in their provision. With the inception of inflation and of the fiscal 
crisis of the state, however, voters chose governments that curbed public expenditure. 
In his account of why constituencies changed their attitude, Desai points out how 
economic and social change eventually led to a more differentiated demand for public goods: 
As countries prospered and citizens became richer, their preferences became more 
sophisticated. They were also able to express their multiple identities in a political way. So 
instead of a homogeneous electorate with single peaked preferences, there are citizens 
groups organized along age, gender, and ethnic lines. Their demands for public goods are 
fragmented by the quality and variety of goods they want. (ibid., p. 72). 
Since social fragmentation leads to demand fragmentation, different aggregations of interests 
turn out to be possible according to what coalitions prevail.15 
Under these conditions, participatory decision-making may be a rather difficult matter 
since what must be deliberated is not only what is most appropriate for the community – or 
even for one’s self – but how to achieve something through logrolling and other forms of 
‘political market’ transactions. The very notion of fairness that Kaul believes should emerge 
from participatory decision-making is likely to fade away or, at best, be very fuzzy. In this 
respect, Desai’s conclusion that ‘it seems the time has come for the public to be much more 
directly involved in formulating preferences, promoting just political bargaining, and 
contributing to the production of national and global public goods, nationally and 
internationally’ (ibid., p. 74) may be encouraging but it begs the question: how can the public 
be more directly involved? Although it is not possible to exhaustively answer, we return to this 
                                                     
15 Desai’s conclusions are reinforced by the existence of vested interests that have all to gain from such 
fragmentation, as when business shifts its private costs onto the community, thereby turning them into 
social costs. (Kapp 1971). 
 in the following section. 
Summing up, in the absence of a strictly technical, price-centred, solution to the 
question of what (broadly defined) public goods to provide, it is reasonable to suggest that the 
decision should be left to those who are directly involved. This suggestion, however, should 
deal with a range of issues that deliberation involves, and that people usually are not informed 
about: macro-effects of micro behaviour, historical change and non-converging interests. 
Neglect of this issue seems to be based on the implicit assumption that there is a unique 
preference ordering, which allows for unequivocal decisions in an undisputable economic 
context. One would expect that economists and other experts, together with political leaders, 
must somehow have a role in this deliberating process. The primary issue, however, is what 
decision criteria should inform deliberation. 
 
6. Decision criteria 
 
It was previously pointed out that, as we extend the range of goods that governments can 
provide and thereby including different types of merit goods, two problems emerge. One is 
that, given the irreducibility of merit goods to market preferences, some alternative criterion 
must be sought. The other is that, in so far as such a criterion is discretionary, it may become 
arbitrary. 
From a market-centred perspective, these two problems are straightforward. The 
conventional view contends that prices provide the information that is required to allocate 
available resources. Market failures may require some public action, but this action is 
nonetheless constrained by the requirements of price-based resource allocation. If we choose to 
provide goods independently of these requirements, we forsake such a criterion and ending up 
with no allocation rule to abide by. Economic welfare does not depend on relative prices any 
more but on the discretionary value judgments of the policy maker. 
The problem, here, is that when market failures abound and cannot be eliminated, there 
is no way to achieve the conditions that underlie the First Fundamental Theorem of welfare 
economics. Under these conditions there is no unique policy solution that achieves efficiency 
and a pragmatic approach is called for: at the very least, policy-makers must choose among 
different ‘Second Best’ solutions. The practical indeterminacy of this situation remains, 
however, to the point that New Institutionalists dismiss the whole problem on the grounds that 
any such attempt is just blackboard economics (Coase 1988) and that the real issue is simply to 
achieve ‘relative efficiency’ (Williamson 1993). The fact of the matter, however, is that once 
 you acknowledge that actual markets do not comply with the requirements set out by 
conventional theory, it is unclear what the efficiency these scholars discuss is supposed to be 
‘relative’ to (Stiglitz 1993). Ultimately, reliance on markets merely depends on a value 
judgment. 
If market failures are downplayed, it is easier to argue that actual markets are not too 
distant from theory. Thus, R. Musgrave’s reliance on neoclassical theory’s relative prices as an 
allocation criterion is reinforced by his minimization of merit goods that deal with distribution 
and ‘ethical preferences’ and his total neglect of their cumulative effects on societal change. In 
fact, the problem with these goods is that they reflect what Sen (1982) terms meta-preferences. 
If preferences clash with meta-preferences, and decisions are made according to the latter, 
prices may be ‘wrong’ in that they do not reflect scarcity and optimization. If prices are 
‘wrong’, choices are misplaced, and the rationale of relative prices gets undermined. 
How does this relate more specifically to the depiction of public goods? First, once we 
acknowledge that coordination of economic activity requires some choice criterion other than 
the one centred on individual preferences, what is this going to be? This begs the question: 
what economy does it pursue? This issue may be addressed in two ways. The traditional one is 
to consider exogenous action as an interference with existing relative prices, whereby the issue 
is to assess whether the resulting allocation is going to be more or less efficient: A typical case 
is Okun’s (1975) bucket metaphor. 
The alternative approach is to recall that the traditionally basic assumption in 
neoclassical theory is that preferences, endowments and technology are given. Another 
assumption, which is less emphasized, is that no market transaction is possible unless there is 
an underlying legal system that ensures how it is actualized. 
Recall that public policy is collective action in restraint, liberation, and expansion of 
individual action. Notice, therefore, that public policy is nothing but a modification of the 
institutional structure of an economy that redefines choice sets (fields of action) for 
individuals. (Bromley 2006, p. 120).16  
This means that, given a range of conditions, the distribution that follows resource 
allocation may be consistent with marginal productivity and relative scarcity but the 
desirability of that distribution and of that allocation – including the composition of output and 
the technology deployed to produce it – depends on choices concerning endowments and the 
legal-economic nexus. 
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish these two approaches in practical policy decisions 
                                                     
16 See also: Commons 1990; Schmid 1987; Bromley 1989; Samuels, Medema and Schmid 1997. 
 because neoclassical theory assumes away historical continuity. There never is a moment when 
endowments, preferences, technology and the legal system are determined: they are taken for 
granted. It is nevertheless the case that these prerequisites must be assessed and possibly 
changed - e.g. by initiating or repealing goods such as compulsory public schooling, 
technological research or a specific labour code - according to some exogenous choice 
criterion. From a strictly neoclassical point of view, efficiency cannot be determined before 
they are selected. It is nevertheless the case that different sets of prerequisites lead to different 
and mutually incomparable allocations, i.e. different and incomparable sets of relative prices. 
The conclusion this leads to is that, even in the context of a neoclassical framework, decisions 
concerning public goods depend on ethical judgments that are a logical prerequisite for relative 
prices.  
 
7. A potentially vicious circle 
 
Moving beyond this static framework, whatever public policy – and public goods - we choose 
to provide, the outcome of our choice feeds back on society. For instance, the 
decommodification of a ‘fictitious commodity’ (Polanyi 1944) such as labour power, through 
the provision of public goods that stabilize employment and real income, may be deemed 
lexicographically superior to the provision of goods via the allocation of non-fictitious 
commodities. In turn, the former may affect the way the latter is achieved. This potential 
economic change extends the main question: what society – not just what economy - does the 
choice criterion pursue? 
To appreciate this issue, let us go back to the discussion about participatory decision-
making as a means to choose. One condition for it to be effective is that people must be in a 
condition to participate. Access to goods and services may be important but, as Sen’s (1999) 
example of the Indian woman suggests, the internalization of gender or of social subordination 
may prevent people from appreciating what change is possible. Under these 
circumstances, the participatory goal will not be achieved fully. Another condition for 
participatory decision-making to be effective is that demand fragmentation should not hinder 
collective decisions. As Desai pointed out, this would lead to a situation where political 
bargaining prevails over participatory decision-making, citizens are distracted from their 
ultimate ends by short term goals and governments reflect petty interests rather than societal 
priorities. 
Such a situation may be aggravated by the asymmetry between governments and 
 individuals, concerning the potential changes in the economy: by definition, governments are 
able to supervise the economy whereas individuals are more likely to focus on their specific 
situation. If the former fail to foresee and to pursue something better than petty interests, the 
latter are likely to accentuate their focus on their sectional concerns. Given the complexity of 
the world they live in and the uncertainty it involves, people may be unable to know and assess 
the technical details of single choices and may be unwilling to give up their short-run goals and 
their vested interests. The fact is that the knowledge - and power – gap between citizens and 
policy makers inevitably leads to a paternalistic bent. Policy makers may exercise discretion 
towards a segmentation of interests or towards their aggregation in a general view of the public 
interest. 
The above issues point to what appears to be a potentially vicious circle: if people are 
not free to choose, they cannot effectively choose how to be free. There seems to be no 
rigorous way out of this, so that what Desai described may confirm the fragility of participatory 
decision-making, R. Musgrave’s fear of a totalitarian turn or the nihilism of conservative 
authors whereby ‘much of the moral rot that we observe, in both private and public behaviour, 
is traceable to the exaggerated size of the public sector relative to the total economy’ 
(Buchanan in Buchanan and Musgrave 2000, p. 217). 
Important as these worries may be, the fact is that they arise within an economy that – 
as the above discussion suggests - does not, and cannot, work if it is coordinated only by prices 
and by rules that are functional to price coordination. While this prejudges any conclusion that 
the above risks can be avoided by merely relying on markets, it raises the question whether an 
alternative to the vicious circle exists. 
It is certainly the case that the sceptical view of government policy tends to be 
overstated by the claim that voters are blind to anything but immediate gain and that, 
consequently, politicians merely pursue their personal interest. To some extent, this claim 
implicitly denies that an ethical judgment may exist that identifies a merit good. 
The above claim also understates Sen’s argument that individuals have many identities, 
which are not always mutually consistent. It neglects that society consists not only of 
individuals but also of intermediate bodies - trade unions, consumer associations, religious 
groups, minority groups, small political parties, civil rights activists, etc. – that reflect these 
identities. These bodies may uphold values and pursue goals which need not be mutually 
consistent and, considering their variety, do not allow for a trivial ‘I give that you may give’ 
political market. If we acknowledge that this type of individual and organization exist, it is 
easier to see that policy makers are obliged to encompass these different values and goals 
 within a general policy perspective if they are to be made mutually consistent. At the very least 
they must couple their segmentation-prone policies with the enhancement of an ideological 
consensus whereby ‘there is no (better) alternative’. 
This leads us to a second issue that the claim understates. It is that people do not merely 
process information nor do they passively adapt to circumstances. People who participate in a 
range of activities around London eventually get to understand what it means to be a Londoner. 
They make sense of the complex world they live in by learning from their personal experience 
and by interacting with others. People who go to look at the Lincoln Memorial face a value of 
national identity, that they may like or dislike but that they must come to terms with. They do 
not only try to understand how the world they live in is but also how it should be. In other 
terms, independently of whether they are aware of it, they formulate meta- preferences. 
These considerations provide theoretical support to Colm’s (1960, pp. 301-2) view that  
many people fail to recognize the function of leadership in a democracy because they confuse 
leaders and dictators. The nature of the public interest, as perceived by millions of voters, must 
be articulated by political leaders, even though the leaders’ interpretations cannot become 
reality except by vote of these millions. 
Colm’s view and the considerations that precede it suggest that two sets of conditions 
possibly provide a way out of the vicious circle.. The first one is that some of the neoclassical 
assumptions concerning individuals – basically what goals they pursue and how they pursue 
them – must be substituted with more extensive ones, so that individual behaviour is subject to 
more degrees of freedom than is conventionally assumed. Second, precisely because 
individuals do not decide mechanically - i.e. by merely reacting to incentives in relation to 
preferences – what they choose to do depends on a myriad of circumstances related to their 
varied nature. 
According to Colm political leaders interpret what voters perceive to be the public 
interest. Perception does not mean full-fledged knowledge or even awareness. Interpretation, in 
turn, is not a mechanical process. What Colm suggests is that, rather than combining meta-
preferences according to some algorithm or in any other way deducing aggregate meta-
preferences, political leaders have an active role. It consists of ‘conceiving, in the light of 
individual belief, judgment, or circumstance’17 what the public interest may be, given the 
‘quick, acute, and intuitive cognition’18 signalled by voters. In other terms, political leaders do 
                                                     
17 Definition of “interpret” in the Merriam-Webster online dictionary (https://www.merriam- 
webster.com/dictionary/interpret; with adaptations). 
18 Definition of “perception” in the Merriam-Webster online dictionary (https://www.merriam- 
webster.com/dictionary/perception). 
 not process information. They try to make sense of what people communicate. They may 
succeed in this learning process just as they may fail.19 The outcome is not some kind of 
collective (meta-)preferences. Much like Tinbergen’s (1953) view, what Colm suggests is that 
policy is grounded in the (meta-)preference functions of policy makers. 
Policy makers who believe that the best way to do their job is to focus on the public 
interest may find a way out of the above mentioned vicious circle by acknowledging the 
manifold characteristics of actual economic actors. More specifically, they may take account of 
the distinction between preferences and meta-preferences. Policy-makers – as well as political 
groups and committed citizens - may try to aggregate interests and formulate meta- preferences 
that represent what they interpret as the (ultimate) ends - the socio-economic priorities – of a 
community rather than merely comply with short term or sectionally specific vested interests.20    
It is most likely that, faced with such ends, people are going to be better able to appreciate what 
the general direction should be. In other terms, it is possible to switch policy goals from the 
short-run emphasis on commodities to a long-run care for well-being.21 Viewed from this 
perspective, policy does not just provide for the efficient and equitable operation of an 
economy. It directs it towards some desirable pattern of societal evolution. It provides a general 
view of what the key issues under discussion are, a cognitive framework that works as a meta-
coordinating device (Ramazzotti 2007). Obviously, this reliance on meta-preferences implies 
that policy makers transcend the ‘obsolete market mentality’ (Polanyi 1947) of conventional 
scholars and their reliance on preferences alone. 
Let us briefly consider what this implies for public goods in practice. Given the above 
discussion, a proper definition requires a focus on what type of ultimate ends are pursued. For 
instance, if we focus on individual interests alone, we can conceive of them as something that 
an individual would buy, if she only could. Consequently, ‘health care’ would presumably 
consist in the provision of pharmaceuticals, medical services and medical infrastructures to 
cure diseases. Similarly, ‘education’ would consist in the transmission of knowledge required 
to become more productive and to earn more. ‘Public transport’ would probably not be 
provided since users would simply pay tickets for what would boil down to be a private 
service. 
                                                     
19 Dow’s (1990; 1996) “Babylonian mode of thought” provides an outline of how this may occur and 
the uncertainty that it involves. 
20 ‘The perspective of practical reason implies that politicians have an obligation to … develop an idea 
for progress and feasible improvement in the society conforming to the common good and ask for a 
fiduciary relationship with citizens in it’ (Mastromatteo, Solari 2014, p. 98). 
21 An example might be the adaptation to a specific institutional context of Martha Nussbaum’s (2006) 
ten ‘central human capabilities’ or of the human rights listed in United Nations (2015). 
 An alternative perspective – focused on the community as a whole – would consider 
benefits that individuals may not even envisage but that are important for the community. 
Thus, ‘health care’ might include early diagnosis but also prevention of diseases through 
changes in working conditions, in consumption of polluting goods, etc. ‘Education’ might 
include, and possibly favour, the preparation of conscious citizens. ‘Public transport’ might aim 
at reducing the pollution and traffic congestion that private transport causes. It might even be 
provided at a loss for the firm that administers it, should this loss be more than compensated by 
the reduction in pollution-related social costs. 
In terms of public policy, the difference between the two perspectives is twofold. First, 
the former takes the status quo for granted – since no single individual would ever be able to 
change it – while the latter may envisage changes to the status quo. Second, the former uses 
private (market) costs as the basic point of reference whereas the latter uses social accounting, 
however difficult and demanding this may be. In terms of societal values, the difference is that 
the former focuses on a society characterized by isolated economic agents whereas the latter 
focuses on ‘developing and enhancing the capacity of citizens to share power and hence to 
collaboratively govern themselves.’ (Brown 2005, p. 59). 
 
8. Concluding remarks 
 
The aim of this article was to discuss the theoretical grounding for the claim that the public 
sector should (or should not) provide public goods, whether directly or indirectly. Its focus was 
less on the internal consistency of theories than on their relevance for public policy. Following 
a brief survey of the analytical strategies one can adopt to deal with public goods, the goods 
that can be labelled public were outlined and these illuminated doubts concerning the 
uniqueness of such a concept. Consequently, the discussion considered the problems that the 
standard approach – based on the price-centred coordination of the economy – faces when it 
must deal with different types of public goods. 
Two main issue emerged. First, in so far as these goods imply market failures, it is 
logically inconsistent to acknowledge that price coordination ‘fails’ but, nevertheless, claim 
that it can remain the crucial criterion – albeit supplemented by institutional devices - to 
coordinate the economy. Second, since prices do not provide the required information, the 
issue is: what alternative choice criteria exist and how do they affect the identification of public 
goods. 
A reasonable alternative to individual actors choosing through prices may be a 
 democratic process. A range of issues emerge, however, that shed doubt on the unqualified 
reliability of this solution. They include the irreducibility of individuals to a single preference 
ordering, the action of vested interests, a contested social environment and the ever-changing 
nature of the economy. Given the complexity that all these elements lead to, one might rely on 
economists and other experts to outline a course of action. It has been argued, however, that, in 
the absence of an a priori technical criterion, choosing a course of action and deciding what 
goods to provide depends on a community’s ultimate ends. This, in turn, begs the question how 
to assess these ends. In so far as democratic – and possibly participatory - decision-making is 
important, this implies that political leaders and other aggregators of interests, as well as the 
people involved, should focus less on people’s preferences than on their meta- preferences and, 
as far as public goods are concerned, on the criteria that these meta- preferences imply. 
The discussion of how the provision of different types of public goods may affect the 
allocation of resources pointed out that public goods may affect relative prices, the overall 
economic structure and the organization of society. These effects feed back into communal 
values, which underlie the very choice criteria for public goods. The conclusion is that public 
goods are a component in a cumulative process of historical change. Public goods reflect but 
also affect the capabilities people have to take part in decisions concerning the society they live 
in. Ultimately, they affect whether people are free to choose. This raises a freedom-related 
vicious circle: freedom may be effectively achieved only through freedom. Alternatively, the 
absence of freedom may preclude the achievement of freedom.  
A possibly pragmatic and progressive way to bypass the above vicious circle is to 
acknowledge that politicians can identify a public interest that takes account of the ultimate 
ends - rather than the sectional interests – of the people involved. Viewed from a slightly 
different perspective, it means they can formulate meta-preferences – what the public interest is 
- rather than preferences (what they have to gain, here and now). Whether they care to do so or 
not is a matter of political choice, not the implication of economic premises. Whether they 
succeed in doing so is a matter of political sensitivity. 
An open-systems perspective such as the one followed in this article hardly allows for a 
once and for all claim of what policy should consist of. Historical change, complex interaction 
within the economy and between the economy and its societal environment point to the need 
for a pragmatic approach to economic policy. The discussion suggested a twofold guideline for 
such an approach: a reliance on a democratic – rather than price-centred - choice of societal 
priorities; the provision of public goods that increase the capability to take part in democratic 
deliberation processes. It is obviously possible to choose different value judgments and 
 formulate different guidelines. Neoliberalism is an interesting example, in this respect. Its goal 
to reduce government spending, especially the provision of public merit goods cannot be based 
on efficiency. Consequently, either the proponents of this policy are acting on wrong premises 
or they are pursuing ultimate ends that require less, rather than more, public goods. In the latter 
case, the relation there is between public goods and participatory decision-making suggests that 
the ultimate ends of a neoliberal society are far from democratic. 
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